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ABSTRACT & KEYWORDS 
 
This thesis examines the current state of the criminal law’s interaction with mentally ill 
persons, with a specific interest in this interaction during pre-trial phases such as arrest 
and bail. It argues that the current provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada that allow 
for limited instances of pre-trial mental health assessments for adults are insufficient. The 
current options, including assessments to determine “not criminally responsible for 
reasons of mental disorder” or “fitness”, are not applicable in many situations. Other 
options available to accused outside of the Criminal Code are also lacking, as they are 
limited to the Mental Health Act, and the efforts of the sparsely situated mental health 
courts across the country. The focus for this paper is the resulting gap which leaves 
mentally ill persons untreated in their illness for longer than is necessary, thus increasing 
their chance of re-offending or breaching their court-imposed order – if they are given 
bail at all. This paper explores other potential options to assist mentally ill offenders who 
are in need of psychiatric intervention. One such option will be a comparison to the 
section 34 assessment option under the Youth Criminal Justice Act for those under 18 
years of age. This discussion compares relevant legislation, leading case law, theoretical 
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Introduction	to	Mental	Health	Considerations	and	Bail		“Providing	opportunities	to	receive	treatment,	not	imposing	punishment,	is	the	just	and	appropriate	response…	The	need	for	treatment	rather	than	punishment	is	rendered	even	more	acute	by	the	fact	that	the	mentally	ill	are	often	vulnerable	and	victimized	in	the	prison	setting,	as	well	as	by	changes	in	the	health	system	that	many	suggest	result	in	greater	numbers	of	the	mentally	ill	being	caught	up	in	the	criminal	process.”	1			-Justice	McLachlin	(as	she	then	was)	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada			Mental	 illness	 and	 the	 criminal	 law	have	 been	 intertwined	 for	 centuries.	 The	 two	have	 shared	a	 confusing	 and	often	difficult	 relationship.	But	 in	 the	 last	 century,	 it	can	be	argued	that	efforts	have	been	made	to	better	that	relationship.			Since	 at	 least	 1991,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 has	 been	 hearing	 litigation	involving	mentally	 ill	 accused	 persons,2	often	 requiring	 Parliament	 to	 reassess	 its	treatment	of	mentally	ill	persons	involved	in	the	criminal	justice	system.	As	just	one	example,	Swain	resulted	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	forcing	the	government	to	abandon	its	former	regime	dealing	with	mentally	ill	persons	incapable	of	having	the	









	In	addition	to	the	section	34	assessment	tool	provided	by	the	YCJA,	young	persons	also	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 be	 assessed	 for	 fitness	 or	 NCR	 considerations	 under	 the	
Criminal	Code.	 Conversely,	 while	 adult	 accused	 persons	 have	 the	 NCR	 and	 fitness	assessment	regimes,	they	have	few	other	options	available	to	them	to	explore	their	mental	health	issues	and	to	create	a	plan	of	treatment.		This	 thesis	will	 explore	 the	 resulting	 gaps	 left	 for	 adult	 accused	persons	 suffering	from	 mental	 health	 issues,	 caused	 by	 the	 limited	 options	 provided	 under	 the	




guilty	of	the	crime	they	have	been	charged	with.	Instead,	 it	recognizes	that	we	can	still	 respect	 the	 right	 to	 be	presumed	 innocent	 by	maintaining	 their	 rights	 to	 bail	and	 trial,	 while	 being	 proactive	 about	 treatment	 opportunities	 for	 those	who	 are	arguably	the	most	vulnerable.	Such	an	approach	to	mentally	ill	accused	persons	has	the	 additional	 benefit	 of	 treating	 those	who	will	 ultimately	 not	 be	 found	 guilty	 of	their	alleged	crime,	but	nevertheless	betters	their	future	prospects	all	the	same.		Jill	Presser	and	Anita	Szigeti	are	two	leading	Ontario	criminal	defence	lawyers	in	the	area	of	mental	disorders.	They	have	written	that	“[m]entally	disordered	accused	are	often	 among	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 and	 the	 most	 marginalized	 people	 in	 our	society.”12	With	 this	 notion	 in	 mind,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 we	 must	 extend	 the	concepts	 of	 rehabilitation	 and	 treatment,	 as	 discussed	 by	 Justice	 McLachlin	 in	
Winko,	to	all	accused	persons	suffering	from	mental	health	disorders.	To	accomplish	this,	 legislation	 is	 suggested	 for	 the	 Criminal	Code	 that	 mirrors	 section	 34	 of	 the	
YCJA.13			
1.1	A	Roadmap:	































these	 contributions	 to	 the	 discussions	 will	 be	 considered	 in	 more	 detail	 as	 we	proceed.		While	 the	current	state	of	bail	 in	Canada	 is	 troublesome,	 it	 is	not	 that	bail	 laws	 in	Canada	have	really	ever	been	exemplary.	We	have	experienced	an	ongoing	battle	to	balance	 competing	 principles	 of	 safety	 of	 the	 public	 with	 individual	 rights	 to	freedom	and	liberty.	Mentally	ill	accused	have	consistently	presented	challenges	for	bail	 courts.	 Understanding	 this	 history	 is	 important	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	current	state	of	the	law,	and	so	we	begin	with	a	historical	review	of	the	law	on	bail.		
2.1	A	Brief	History	of	Bail	Law	





appears	 to	 be	 “as	 old	 as	 the	 law	 of	 England	 itself...	 explicitly	 recognized	 by	 our	earliest	 writers”.35	Justice	 Trotter,	 a	 Jurist	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 Ontario	considered	to	be	the	leading	authority	on	bail,	writes	about	bail	being	the	result	of	the	inability	to	keep	detainees	alive	and	the	frequency	of	escapees	in	12th	and	13th	century	 England,36	as	 opposed	 to	 “any	 love	 of	 an	 abstract	 liberty”.37	This	 led	 to	 a	system	much	like	that	still	seen	today	in	the	United	States,38	where	family	or	friends	secure	 the	 release	 of	 the	 accused	 into	 their	 care	 by	 putting	 up	 some	 form	 of	 a	financial	assurance.39	During	this	earliest-documented	phase	of	bail	in	England,	the	process	was	already	being	criticized	for	being	ill-defined,	for	the	sheriffs	in	charge	of	detainees	having	discretion	that	was	too	wide-ranging,	and	for	corruption	amongst	the	sheriffs	which	allowed	for	bribes.40			From	1275	onwards,	for	roughly	550	years,	bail	was	dealt	with	under	the	Statute	of	





accused’s	 guilt;	 and	 the	 ‘outlawed’	 status	of	 the	 accused.”43	The	main	bail	 concern	during	this	period	of	time	was	the	continued	abuse	of	the	system	by	sheriffs	due	to	their	discretion	in	determining	the	suitability	of	a	proposed	surety.44	This	led	to	the	powers	of	bail	being	transferred	to	justices	who	were	seen	to	be	more	objective	and	better	versed	in	the	law.45		1826	 to	 1848	 saw	 a	 gradual	 shift	 in	 the	 concerns	 set	 out	 in	 the	 legislation	when	considering	the	question	of	bail.	First,	the	Criminal	Justice	Act,	182646	eradicated	the	distinction	between	bailable	and	non-bailable	offences.	This	allowed	 for	bail	 to	be	sought	 on	 all	 charges.	 Then,	 England’s	 Parliament	 amended	 and	 extended	 the	provisions	of	 this	act	 to	create	a	new	statute47	which	articulated	the	main	concern	for	 bail	 as	 being	 the	 attendance	 in	 court	 of	 the	 accused.48	Further	 emphasis	 on	attendance	at	court	as	the	main	bail	consideration	was	seen	with	the	introduction	of	the	 Indictable	 Offences	 Act,	 1848.49	This	 act	 sought	 sufficient	 sureties	 to	 ensure	attendance.	 This	 shift	 meant	 that	 the	 19th	 century	 bail	 laws	 of	 England	 became	“solely	 concerned	 with	 ensuring	 the	 accused	 attended	 in	 court	 for	 trial…	 Other	criteria	for	release	developed	much	later.”50		



















release.69	Most	concerning	was	the	“disturbing	relationship”	he	found	between	pre-trial	detention	and	the	outcome	of	trial.	As	Justice	Trotter	summarized	it:		 “…[Professor	 Friedland’s]	 study	 found	 that	 a	 detained	 accused	 was	 more	likely	 than	 his	 or	 her	 bailed	 counterpart	 to	 be	 convicted	 of	 the	 offence	charged.	 Furthermore,	 a	 detained	 person	 was	 more	 likely	 to	 receive	 a	custodial	sentence.	Simply	put,	accused	persons	who	were	denied	bail	received	
more	jail,	more	often.”	(emphasis	is	mine)		Soon	 after	 Professor	 Friedland’s	 research,	 a	 report	 was	 created	 by	 the	 Canadian	Committee	 on	 Corrections,70	calling	 for	 a	 reduction	 in	 judicial	 discretion	 on	decisions	 of	 bail.	 Recommendations	 were	 also	 being	 offered	 by	 the	 Royal	Commission	 following	 their	 criticisms	 contained	 in	 their	 report. 71 	These	recommendations	were	accepted	and	 included	 in	 the	Criminal	Code,72	as	 the	result	of	Bill	(C-218)	which	came	into	force	in	1972	as	the	Bail	Reform	Act.73				The	Bail	Reform	Act	was	seen	as	a	complete	overhaul	and	codification	of	the	law	of	bail.74	In	 keeping	 with	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 and	 the	Canadian	Committee	on	Corrections,	a	number	of	changes	were	made.	Powers	were	given	 to	 police	 to	 release,	 avoiding	 unnecessary	 arrest	 and	 detention.75	Cash	deposits	 were	 restricted	 in	 use.76	Following	 the	 case	 law	 precedent	 first	 seen	 in	






Reform	 Act	 came	 about	 four	 years	 later,82	shifting	 the	 onus	 of	 proof	 regarding	release	onto	the	accused	in	a	number	of	situations,83		and	also	expanding	the	scope	of	the	secondary	ground.84		The	 Bail	 Reform	Act	 has	 largely	 remained	 the	 law	 on	 bail	 in	 Canada,	 with	 some	exception.	One	exception	comes	from	the	amendments	made	to	offer	courts	a	“menu	of	conditions…	[which]	has	made	it	more	difficult	to	obtain	bail	and	has	resulted	in	more	stringent	 release	orders.”85	This	 trend	 is	 said	 to	have	 followed	 the	anti-gang	amendments	to	the	Criminal	Code,	as	well	as	the	legislation	that	followed	the	events	of	 September	 11,	 2001.86	The	 “tough	 on	 crime”	 trend	 in	 these	 amendments	 has	arguably	eroded	the	presumption	of	condition-less	bail,	initially	sparked	by	the	Bail	
Reform	Act	in	the	1970’s.87			In	terms	of	legislation,	two	further	pieces	should	be	considered.	First,	the	Canadian	
Bill	of	Rights88	specifically	addresses	bail	 in	section	2(f)	and	calls	 for	both	the	right	to	 be	 presumed	 innocent	 until	 proved	 guilty,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 “reasonable	 bail	without	just	cause”.89	Despite	being	legislation	that	still	remains	in	force,	the	Bill	of	





Canadian	Charter	of	Rights	and	Freedoms.90	Because	of	the	Charter,	courts	have	held	that	it	would	be	inappropriate	to	reassess	or	re-interpret	the	Bill	of	Rights.91			The	Charter	explicitly	protects	the	right	to	bail	in	section	11(e):			 “s.	11		 Any	person	charged	with	an	offence	has	the	right…		 	 …(e)	not	to	be	denied	reasonable	bail	without	just	cause.”92		Despite	its	express	promise,	the	Charter	was	initially	approached	with	caution	as	it	related	to	bail	because	of	the	heavy	lifting	thought	to	have	been	done	already	by	the	




opposed	to	requiring	the	Crown	to	show	cause	why	bail	is	not	justified.	In	Pearson,	the	 majority	 held	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 section	 515(6)(d)	 was	 to	 dilute	 the	 basic	entitlement	to	bail.	They	found	the	same	applied	to	section	515(6)(a)	in	Morales.97	Two	considerations	were	delineated	 in	Pearson:98	that	 the	 restriction	on	 the	basic	entitlement	to	bail	is	permissible	if	two	conditions	are	present.	Firs,	bail	must	only	be	 denied	 in	 a	 narrow	 set	 of	 circumstances.	 Second,	 the	 denial	 of	 bail	 must	 be	necessary	 to	 promote	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	 bail	 system,	 and	 is	 not	undertaken	 for	 any	 purpose	 extraneous	 to	 the	 bail	 system.	 Applying	 this	 to	 the	reverse	onus	provisions,	it	was	held	that	they	did	not	infringe	section	11(e),	as	the	effect	of	the	provision	was	to	“…establish	a	set	of	special	bail	rules	in	circumstances	where	the	normal	bail	process	is	incapable	of	functioning	properly.”99			Of	interest	is	the	minority	decision	in	Pearson,	written	by	Justice	McLachlin	(as	she	then	 was).	 Her	 decision	 was	 concurred	 with	 by	 Justice	 La	 Forest.	 The	 facts	 of	




allows	 for	pre-trial	detention	 that	 is	 contrary	 to	 the	 “public	 interest”	because	of	 a	concern	 that	 the	 accused	may	 commit	 further	 offences	while	 on	 bail.	 This	 idea	 of	detention	 in	 the	public	 interest,	often	referred	to	as	preventative	detention,	 is	one	that	 will	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 our	 discussions	 relating	 to	 the	 intersection	 of	mental	 health	 and	 bail.	 Therefore,	 a	 review	 of	 Morales	 and	 the	 path	 that	preventative	bail	has	taken	is	warranted.		
2.1.iii	Detention	Necessary	in	the	Public	Interest		




	Five	years	after	Morales,	Parliament	amended	section	515(10)	in	1997	in	such	a	way	that	 it	had	the	effect	of	reintroducing	“the	public	 interest”	ground	for	detention.107	Instead	of	re-adding	it	to	the	secondary	ground,	Parliament	gave	it	its	own	ground,	which	 has	 since	 become	 known	 as	 the	 “tertiary	 ground”	 for	 detention.108		 At	 the	time,	the	section	read	as	follows:		 s.	515(10)	For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	the	detention	of	an	accused	is		justified	only	on	one	or	more	of	the	following	grounds…		…	 (c)	 on	 any	other	 just	 cause	being	 shown	and	without	 limiting	 the	generality	of	the	foregoing	where	the	detention	is	necessary	in	order	to	maintain	confidence	in	the	administration	of	justice,	having	regard	to	 all	 of	 the	 circumstances,	 including	 the	 apparent	 strength	 of	 the	prosecution’s	 case,	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 offence,	 the	circumstances	 surrounding	 its	 commission	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 a	lengthy	term	of	imprisonment.			This	 new	 ground	 for	 detention	 provided	 for	 renewed	 litigation	 of	 the	 concept	 of	“public	interest”,	and	made	its	way	back	to	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	again	in	R.	
v	Hall.109		















detained	 for	 preventative	 reasons	 under	 the	 secondary	 and	 sometimes	 tertiary	grounds.119	As	such,	we	turn	now	to	a	discussion	of	preventative	detention.		
















their	appearances.	 In	 this	way,	knowing	more	about	 their	 illness	 is	also	helpful	 to	satisfy	 the	 primary	 grounds.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 person	 has	 challenges	 with	remembering	dates	on	account	of	their	mental	disorder,	then	the	Court	will	want	to	be	 assured	 that	 there	 is	 some	 way	 they	 will	 remember	 their	 future	 court	 date.	Perhaps	 keeping	 a	 calendar	 is	 the	 simple	 answer,	 or	 if	 the	 person	 has	 a	 support	worker	 in	 the	 community,	 the	 concern	 can	 be	 mitigated.	 The	 primary	 ground	concerns	 are	 undoubtedly	 affected	 by	 the	 mental	 health	 of	 the	 accused	 person	before	 the	 court.	 	 Arguably,	 though,	 the	 risk	 of	 re-offending	 is	 where	 most	 bail	courts	 will	 be	 concerned	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 mentally	 ill	 accused	 persons,	 and	 so	understanding	 the	 context	 in	 which	 we	 currently	 view	 preventative	 detention	 is	helpful.		
2.2.i	The	Presumption	of	Innocence	is	Not	Absolute	Situations	other	 than	bail	 considerations	have	required	our	courts	 to	consider	 the	liberty	interests	of	Canadian	citizens.	For	example,	in	the	context	of	mandatory	jail	sentences	 for	 absolute	 liability	 offences,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 found	 in	








prevention	as	a	 legitimate	aim	of	 the	 law,	 and	 thus	allowed	detention	 to	 continue	occurring	on	this	ground.	The	majority	may	have	erroneously	concentrated	on	the	particular	background	of	 this	 accused,	Mr.	 Salerno.	 It	 is	 an	 interesting	question	 to	posit	whether	their	decision	would	have	been	the	same	were	the	accused	person	a	more	palatable	individual.	The	result,	regardless	of	the	characteristics	of	Mr.	Salerno	himself,	 was	 the	 ongoing	 pervasiveness	 of	 a	 culture	 of	 risk-aversion	 and	 crime	prevention	 now	 being	 applied	 to	 all	 accused	 persons	 –	 even	 those	 who	were	 far	from	being	a	mafia	boss.		




Canada	 Justice	 dissented	 on	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 tertiary	 ground	 provision	after	 removal	 of	 the	 words	 “in	 the	 public	 interest”	 in	Morales.	 Instead,	 all	 of	 the	Justices	of	the	Canadian	court	agreed	that	it	was	a	legitimate	aim	of	the	legislature	to	prevent	crime	 -	much	 like	 the	majority	 found	 in	Salerno.	 In	 the	end,	 it	has	 left	 the	provincial	 bail	 courts	 with	 an	 unenviable	 task:	 how	 to	 determine	 when	 one	 is	“substantially	likely”	to	reoffend.		As	alluded	 to	earlier,	 this	 task	 is	difficult	because	of	 the	problems	associated	with	predicting	future	criminal	activity.	In	the	context	of	mentally	ill	persons,	it	has	been	said	 that	 “[m]ental	 health	 professionals	 erroneously	 predict	 dangerousness	 up	 to	95%	of	the	time.	Judges	are	unlikely	to	be	better	predictors.”138	In	R.	v	Lyons,139	the	court	 recognized	 that	 psychiatric	 evidence	 can	 be	 notoriously	 inaccurate	 in	 its	attempt	 to	 forecast	 future	 violent	 behavior.	 The	 Court	 in	Morales	 was	 confronted	with	the	argument	that	it	is	difficult	to	predict	future	behavior,	but	still	did	not	find	the	secondary	ground	resultantly	problematic.	They	held	that	“the	 impossibility	of	making	exact	predictions	does	not	preclude	a	bail	system	which	aims	to	deny	bail	to	those	who	will	likely	be	dangerous.”140	Instead,	they	contented	themselves	with	the	review	provisions	provided	in	the	bail	process	for	those	who	are	ordered	detained.			




ensue	if	the	risk	comes	to	pass.	For	example,	even	a	very	grave	risk	that	an	incorrigible	petty	thief	will	shoplift	again	if	granted	bail	is	one	that	the	court	might	be	willing	to	 take	when	balanced	against	 the	accused’s	constitutional	right	 to	 reasonable	 bail.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	where	 the	 anticipated	 harm	 is	very	 grave,	 a	 more	 remote	 risk	 may	 be	 sufficient	 to	 meet	 the	 test	 of	substantial	likelihood.”143		Justice	Trotter	points	out	that	a	standard	that	is	too	low	will	fail	to	satisfy	the	“just	cause”	requirement	under	the	Charter	that	bail	can	only	be	denied	in	a	narrow	set	of	circumstances.	 If	 the	standard	 is	held	 too	high,	 it	would	undermine	 the	 finding	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	that	our	inability	to	predict	future	behavior	is	not	an	issue	 to	 worry	 ourselves	 about.	 Instead,	 he	 suggests	 the	 proper	 and	 accepted	approach	to	be	the	“enhanced	balance	of	probabilities	standard”.144				





Crown	 can	 show	why	 that	 should	 not	 be	 the	 case.146	Starting	with	 a	 Summons	 to	appear,	 issued	without	 conditions	by	police,	 all	 the	way	up	 to	a	 residential	 surety	bail	 with	 house	 arrest	 requirements,	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 liberty	 afforded	 to	accused	persons	can	vary	greatly.	This	variation	allows	courts	to	have	the	flexibility	needed	 to	 fashion	 bail	 terms	 that	 address	 the	 three	 potential	 grounds	 of	 bail	concerns.	The	following	diagram	is	illustrative	of	these	increasingly	onerous	rungs:		







































	“Criminalization	is	another	facet	of	the	narrative	of	mental	health	and	criminal	justice.	Testimony	before	the	Hyde	Inquiry	from	front-line	police	officers	and	other	witnesses	illuminated	the	fact	that	people	having	problems	with	their	mental	health	in	the	community	often	find	themselves	‘drawn	into	the	justice	system.’	Witnesses	to	the	Inquiry	made	a	direct	link	between	the	inadequacy	of	mental	health	services	in	the	community	and	through	the	health	care	system	and	the	criminalization	of	persons	with	mental	illness.”169	-Justice	Anne	Derrick		This	discussion	is	not	the	first	to	consider	the	overlap	of	mental	health	and	criminal	justice,	and	it	certainly	will	not	be	the	last.	The	relationship	between	the	two	is	so	long	and	storied,	that	like	the	laws	on	bail,	properly	documenting	its	history	is	likely	an	 impossible	 task.	 Instead,	 this	 discussion	 will	 consider	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	history,	only	to	the	extent	necessary	to	have	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	current	options	available	to	mentally	ill	accused	persons.	We	will	then	look	at	those	options,	limited	as	they	are	–	including	the	“not	criminally	responsible	for	reason	of	mental	disorder”	and	“fitness”	assessments,	the	impact	on	mens	rea	considerations,	mental	health	courts,	and	the	potential	application	of	the	Mental	Health	Act.170			
3.1	A	Brief	History	of	Mental	Health	and	Criminal	Justice		3.1.i	The	Lieutenant-Governor	System	





Criminal	 Lunatics	Act172	in	 Britain.	 This	 act	 added	 a	 third	 option	 to	 the	 potential	verdicts	 allowable	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 avoid	 Mr.	 Hadfield’s	 situation	 from	 happening	again	–	the	verdict	of	“not	guilty	by	reason	of	insanity”173	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	“NGRI”).	If	this	verdict	was	given	to	an	accused	person,	they	would	be	placed	in	an	asylum	instead	of	in	jail.			In	Canada,	a	similar	approach	was	taken.	Until	1992,	section	542(2)	of	the	Criminal	









unfit	accused	without	a	requirement	for	the	Crown	to	establish	a	prima	facie	case.187	The	 second	 recommendation	was	 to	 stop	 the	 automatic	 detention	 of	 those	 found	NGRI	without	evidence	that	they	pose	a	risk	of	danger	to	the	public.188	Legislation	to	address	these	issues	was	drafted	in	1986,	but	came	to	a	halt	due	to	the	controversy	surrounding	cost	implications	for	the	new	processes.189	It	was	not	until	R.	v	Swain190	in	 1991	 that	 the	 government	 was	 forced	 to	 make	 it	 a	 top	 priority.	 While	 Swain	assisted	 with	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 lieutenant-governor	 system,	 many	 issues	continue.	
3.1.ii	Swain	and	the	Criminal	Code	Amendments	










Of	particular	interest	to	this	discussion,	the	new	provisions	allowed	an	assessment	for	NCR	or	fitness	to	be	ordered	at	any	stage	of	the	proceedings.198	There	no	longer	needed	 to	 be	 reasonable	 grounds	 deriving	 from	 medical	 evidence,	 which	 often	meant	that	in	the	pre-1992	system,	the	issue	was	only	coming	up	at	the	trial	stage.	Instead,	 this	now	allowed	an	accused’s	assessment	 to	be	ordered	as	early	as	 their	first	 appearance	 post-charge.	 It	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 to	 have	 an	 accused	assessed	as	 early	 as	possible	where	 there	was	 concern	 that	 they	did	not	have	 the	requisite	mens	rea	to	commit	the	offence	on	account	of	their	mental	disorder.		The	1992	amendments	also	codified	the	test	for	fitness,	which	had	been	previously	undefined.	Section	2	now	defines	unfit	as:	






Since	 Part	 XX.1	 was	 introduced,	 the	 federal	 and	 provincial	 levels	 of	 government	have	 continued	 discussions	 related	 to	 provisions	 that	 had	 not	 originally	 been	proclaimed	 in	1992	due	 to	 time	constraints	and	controversy.202	There	was	also	an	acknowledgment	that	there	were	other	areas	in	need	of	reform.203	To	this	end,	the	courts	 continue	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 dialogue.	 For	 example,	 the	 1992	case	of	R.	v	Parks204	saw	the	case	of	an	accused	who	was	acquitted	of	murdering	his	mother-in-law,	and	the	attempted	murder	of	his	father-in-law.	He	was	found	to	have	been	 in	 a	 state	 of	 non-insane	 automatism	 while	 sleepwalking,	 which	 was	 not	considered	a	 “disease	of	 the	mind”.	As	a	 result,	he	was	acquitted	outright,	 causing	controversy	across	the	country.	The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	agreed	with	the	trial	judge’s	decision	 to	only	put	 to	 the	 jury	 the	defence	of	automatism,	 finding	 that	no	policy	 reason	 prevented	 non-insane	 automatism	 from	 being	 a	 full	 defence.205	The	court,	 did	 however,	 suggest	 legislative	 reform	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 defence.	 Such	legislation	was	drafted	and	 tabled	 the	 following	year,	but	a	change	 in	government	ultimately	resulted	in	the	amendments	not	being	pursued.206			The	new	regime	was	also	tested	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	the	1999	case	of	





significant	threat	to	the	safety	of	 the	public,	otherwise	an	absolute	discharge	must	be	granted.209			In	2002,	Parliament	designated	a	committee	to	undertake	a	review	of	Part	XX.1.210	This	committee	made	a	number	of	recommendations,	which	the	government	mostly	endorsed	 in	 their	 response.	 In	 response	 to	 Parks,	 they	 agreed	 that	 no	 changes	needed	to	be	made	to	the	mental	disorder	definition,	and	that	there	was	no	need	to	codify	automatism.211	These	consultations	resulted	in	Bill	C-10,	introduced	in	2004.	One	of	the	amendments	addressed	the	concern	of	the	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	in	R.	
















assessor	 from	 the	 hospital.	 This	 resource	 issue	will	 be	 discussed	 again	 later,	 as	 it	plays	a	predominant	consideration	in	any	calls	for	reform	of	the	system.		









3.2.i	Section	672.11	of	the	Criminal	Code	To	answer	 the	question	of	 “what	 can	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	offer	mentally-ill	accused	persons?”	we	can	begin	with	what	we	know	for	sure	thus	far:	accused	can	be	assessed	under	section	672.11	of	 the	Criminal	Code	 for	questions	of	 fitness	and	NCR.	As	we	have	come	to	learn,	fitness	assessments	answer	the	question	of	whether	an	accused	is	able	to	conduct	a	defence.226	An	implicit	requirement,	then,	is	that	the	accused	be	presenting	at	the	time	of	their	court	appearance,	as	unfit.			NCR	assessments	are	 interested	 in	diseases	of	 the	mind,227	occurring	at	the	time	of	









junctures	 at	 which	 it	 can	 be	 most	 important”.238	So	 what	 about	 the	 rest	 of	 our	mentally	ill	accused	persons?	What	options	are	there	for	them?			

















and	 30	 months	 at	 the	 Superior	 Court	 level	 is	 presumably	 appropriate.249	These	types	of	 time	 lapses,	 for	an	diagnosed	or	untreated	mentally	 ill	offender,	 can	have	negative	 and	 dire	 consequences.	 While	 we	 may	 hope	 that	 the	 accused	 has	 good	counsel	to	assist	them	with	getting	the	help	they	need	independently	of	the	criminal	justice	 system,	 this	 ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 many	 Canadians	 continue	 to	 go	unrepresented	each	year	in	our	justice	system.	It	also	ignores	the	inability	for	many	accused	 to	 afford	 the	 type	 of	 counseling	 or	 treatment	 they	 need,	 which	 often	 is	unable	to	be	mitigated	by	the	mere	fact	that	they	do	have	counsel.	When	courts	do	order	counseling	as	part	of	their	sentence,	the	assistance	ordered	may	be	misguided	if	 the	 court	 does	 not	 have	 information	 otherwise	 available	 to	 them	 about	 the	offender’s	mental	health.	Further	in	the	process,	the	Probation	Officer	given	carriage	of	a	mentally	ill	person’s	file	may	also	be	ill	informed	on	how	to	better	assist	them	as	it	 relates	 to	 setting	 them	 up	 with	 the	 proper	 counselling.	 Further,	 we	 miss	 the	opportunity	to	help	those	who	are	struggling	with	undiagnosed	or	untreated	mental	health	issues	who	may	never	be	found	guilty	of	an	offence,	either	because	they	are	innocent,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	of	 evidence	 for	 conviction,	or	because	 their	 charges	were	otherwise	diverted	or	withdrawn.	These	missed	opportunities	will	play	a	prevalent	role	in	this	discussion	as	we	continue	on.		














Mental	health	courts	have	confirmed	that	the	law	has	therapeutic	qualities,	which	if	administered	properly,	could	help	 improve	the	 lives	of	mentally	 ill	accused.266	The	problem,	though,	is	that	even	with	the	introduction	of	these	specialty	courts,	it	may	be	 that	 the	 law	 is	 still	not	being	administered	properly.	This	argument	 follows,	as	some	significant	criticisms	of	these	courts	do	exist.			First,	 there	 is	 a	 major	 disparity	 in	 the	 services	 offered	 to	 mentally	 ill	 accused	persons	 simply	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 geographical	 location.	 While	 some	 larger	 cities	have	these	mental	health	courts,	 like	London	and	Toronto,	a	staggering	number	of	jurisdictions	 do	 not.	 This	 includes	 other	 large	 cities	 and	 small	 jurisdictions	 alike.	Thus,	if	no	mental	health	court	exists	in	the	jurisdiction	that	the	accused	is	charged	in,	they	are	unlikely	to	benefit	from	the	same	therapeutic	model	that	their	counter-part	 in	 a	 different	 city	 could.	 This	 disparity	 could	 potentially	 be	 the	 source	 of	












leaves	an	entire	group	of	accused	persons,	some	of	whom	will	not	actually	be	guilty	of	 anything,	 without	 recourse	 for	 treatment	 options	 when	 interacting	 with	 our	criminal	justice	system	anyways.			Some	might	argue	that	this	is	not	the	goal	of	the	justice	system.	But	when	we	know	that	mentally	 ill	persons	seem	to	be	 “drawn	 into	 the	criminal	 justice	 system”,274	it	seems	 negligent	 for	 us	 to	 not	 acknowledge	 the	 fact	 that	 legally	 innocent	 persons	who	are	also	mentally	ill	will	interact	with	our	system.	In	this	way,	we	are	missing	opportunities	 to	 assist	 these	persons.	 The	question	 that	might	 arise	 as	 a	 result	 of	this	suggestion	is	whether	accused	persons	should	be	forced	to	accept	the	offers	of	help,	were	 they	made	available	by	 the	 courts.	This	 is	 a	 complex	and	controversial	topic	that	likely	extends	outside	the	reach	of	this	discussion.	For	our	purposes,	it	is	being	suggested	that	the	assessment	and	treatment	be	entered	into	voluntarily,	as	it	is	more	likely	to	be	successful	under	those	conditions.			
3.2.v	 The	Mental	Health	Act	




disorder,	 the	 judge	may,	 by	 order,	 remand	 that	 person	 for	 admission	 as	 a	patient	to	a	psychiatric	facility	for	a	period	of	not	more	than	two	months.277		However,	a	 few	problems	quickly	surface,	proving	that	 the	promissory	qualities	of	this	legislation	are	not	yet	the	answer.	First,	we	must	consider	section	23.	It	requires	the	 judge	 considering	 section	 21	 or	 22	 not	 to	 make	 such	 order	 until	 they	 have	“…ascertain[ed]	 from	the	senior	physician	of	a	psychiatric	 facility	that	the	services	of	the	psychiatric	facility	are	available…”.278	As	we	have	already	discussed	briefly,	a	major	problem	with	the	assessment	options	under	the	NCR	and	fitness	legislation	is	the	lack	of	available	beds	in	forensic	psychiatric	hospitals.	Availability	of	services	is	likely	an	issue,	then,	under	the	Mental	Health	Act	provisions	as	well.		A	second	issue	relates	to	the	fact	that	mental	health	legislation	is	not	consistent	or	uniform	from	province	to	province.	While	this	opportunity	may	make	itself	available	in	Ontario,	it	is	not	necessarily	available	in	other	provinces.	It	has	been	pointed	out	that	 this	 issue	 needs	 to	 be	 litigated	 in	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada,	 so	 that	 all	provinces	 may	 be	 subjected	 to	 the	 same	 rules.279	The	 other	 answer,	 as	 we	 will	discuss	 more	 in	 depth	 in	 Part	 5	 of	 our	 discussion	 below,	 is	 for	 the	 federal	government	 to	 make	 amendments	 to	 the	 Criminal	 Code,	 which	 could	 provide	consistency	nation-wide.		Leaving	 these	 assessment	 options	 to	 the	 provincial	 government	 has	 also	 led	 to	conflicting	case	law	about	whether	provincial	legislation	can	be	invoked	in	criminal	proceedings.280	In	Ontario,	 inclusion	of	the	words	“charged	with	or	convicted	of	an	offence”	seems	to	clearly	signal	that	this	legislation	is	meant	to	apply	in	the	criminal	context.	 Yet,	 not	 all	 courts	 agree	 on	 this.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 see	 cases	 like	




assessment	 provisions	 to	 operate	 such	 that	 a	 thirty-day	 remand	 in	 a	 psychiatric	facility	for	the	purposes	of	an	assessment	was	allowed.	This	was	notable	because	it	was	over	 the	objections	of	defence	 counsel	 that	 this	was	ordered.	The	 report	 that	resulted	from	Mr.	Lenart’s	assessment	was	also	allowed	to	be	used	at	the	sentencing	stage.	Similarly	in	R.	v	Neverson,282	an	Ontario	provincial	court	relied	on	the	Mental	





such	power	exists	for	the	purposes	of	bail.287		In	R.	v	Knoblauch,	the	Supreme	Court	of	 Canada	 upheld	 the	 ability	 for	 a	 sentencing	 judge	 to	 direct	 an	 accused,	 at	 his	request,	 to	 serve	 a	 conditional	 sentence	 in	 a	 mental	 health	 facility.	 Barrett	 and	Shandler	argue	that	if	this	kind	of	term	is	permissible,	sentencing	courts	must	have	the	power	to	obtain	information	on	the	accused’s	mental	condition	to	craft	the	right	sentence.288			
3.3	The	Shortcomings	of	the	Current	Options	Some	 of	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 options	 currently	 available	 to	 mentally	 ill	 adult	accused	have	already	been	touched	on.	However,	other	shortcomings	also	exist	that	require	 discussion.	 Despite	 an	 attempt	 to	 move	 towards	 rehabilitation	 and	 a	therapeutic	 model	 of	 justice,	 the	 research	 shows	 that	 we	 still	 have	 a	 growing	number	of	mentally	ill	accused	persons	in	the	prison	system.289	This	means	that	the	efforts	 we	 have	 mad	 thus	 far	 are	 not	 adequate.	 A	 goal	 of	 this	 discussion	 is	 to	consider	what	other	options	the	government	should	consider	in	order	to	reduce	this	statistic.	 One	 such	 option,	 the	 section	 34	 assessment	 option	 available	 to	 youth	accused	under	the	Youth	Criminal	Justice	Act	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		




discussion	 of	 this	 issue	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 Janet	 Lieper,	 who	 has	 since	 been	appointed	 to	 the	bench.	She	points	 to	 the	need	 for	 counsel	 to	bring	habeus	corpus	applications	more	and	more	frequently	in	order	to	force	hospitals	to	make	room	for	their	clients.290	In	response,	 these	applications	are	criticized	by	 the	hospitals:	 they	see	this	tactic	as	unethical	on	account	of	the	“jumping	of	the	queue”	that	results	for	that	client.291	As	we	have	moved	 farther	away	 from	the	Hussein	case,	 the	more	we	are	 seeing	 section	 672.11	 assessments	 not	 being	 done	 in	 forensic	 hospitals	 at	 all.	Instead,	 accused	 are	 being	 detained	 at	 detention	 centers	 where	 assessments	 are	often	 then	 occurring	 via	 video	 link.292	This	 practice	 completely	 removes	 the	 little	therapeutic	benefit	 that	was	previously	derived	from	an	assessment	under	section	672.11.	The	situation	is	not	likely	to	improve	during	the	current	regime	of	provincial	government	 in	Ontario,	as	recently	an	announcement	was	made	that	will	cut	$330	million	for	mental	health	care	funding.293		









The	other	answer	to	this	problem	is	the	accused’s	right	to	remain	silent.300	Part	XX.1	encourages,	 but	 does	not	 require,	 the	person	 to	 participate	 in	 the	process.301	This	may	be	short-sighted,	though.	There	will	be	times	when	an	accused	wants	to	make	use	of	the	opportunity	to	be	assessed	by	a	psychiatrist	and	have	recommendations	made	as	to	how	to	better	their	mental	health.	They	may	be	concerned	about	making	admissions	during	 that	 assessment,	 though,	 that	will	 hurt	 their	 court	 case.	 If	 they	instead	 opt	 to	 remain	 silent	 and	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 assessment,	 they	 are	 also	missing	 the	 opportunity	 of	 seeing	 a	 professional	 who	 might	 otherwise	 not	 be	available	to	them	to	assist	them	with	their	underlying	disorder.				A	 final	 option	 has	 been	 carved	 out	 by	 the	 court	 in	 R.	 v	 Bernardo,302	where	 they	accepted	that	under	the	section	672.11	provisions,	the	psychiatrist	may	be	directed	to	not	create	a	report	to	be	disclosed	to	the	court,	and	thus	the	Crown.	Instead,	the	psychiatrist	was	directed	to	report	back	to	the	defence.			




against	his	will	 longer	than	if	he	had	been	found	guilty	of	the	offence	and	served	a	criminal	 sentence.	 This	 is	 seen	 as	 such	 an	 issue,	 that	 prominent	 defence	 lawyers	have	written	about	the	need	to	avoid	NCR	assessments	as	often	as	possible.303	 Parliament	 had,	 in	 fact,	 turned	 their	 mind	 to	 this	 issue	 when	 they	 were	 first	considering	the	1992	amendments	that	resulted	in	Part	XX.1.	“Capping”	provisions	had	 been	 drafted,	 which	 were	 designed	 to	 guard	 against	 the	 NCR	 accused	 being	detained	for	periods	longer	than	if	they	had	been	criminally	sentenced.304	The	result	of	 the	NCR	provisions	being	extended	 to	summary	offences	heightened	 the	risk	of	disparities	 between	 the	 potential	 periods	 of	 detention.305	Bill	 C-30	 would	 have	capped	 the	 detention	 available	 in-hospital	 for	 NCR	 accused	 to	 the	 maximum	sentence	 available	 for	 the	 index	 offence.	 There	 were	 three	 capping	 categories	drafted.	The	first,	for	murder	and	other	life	imprisonment	offences,	also	held	the	cap	at	life.	Indictable	“designated	offences”	would	have	hospital	detention	capped	at	the	shorter	of	either	10	years	or	the	maximum	period	of	imprisonment	for	the	offence.	Finally,	 the	 residual	 category	 of	 “all	 other	 circumstances”	would	 have	 allowed	 for	capping	 at	 either	 2	 years	 or	 the	 maximum	 period	 of	 imprisonment	 available,	whichever	 was	 shorter.306	These	 caps	 would	 still	 likely	 have	 caused	 disparity,	 as	most	offenders	do	not	receive	the	maximum	available	sentence	available	under	the	






































the	 availability	 of	 resources,	 like	 our	 adult	 system.	 As	 a	 safe-guard,	 it	 includes	sections	like	29(1)	to	prevent	persons	from	“impoverished	backgrounds	or	severely	dysfunctional	 families,	or	who	are	suffering	 from	mental	 illnesses…	end[ing]	up	 in	custody	simply	because	they	are	homeless	and	there	is	nowhere	in	the	community	for	 them	to	go”.334	To	 fill	 this	gap,	we	often	see	many	more	state	actors	come	 into	play	 at	 youth	 bail	 hearings,	 like	 child	 protection	 workers	 –	 but	 this,	 too,	 is	dependent	on	available	resources.		Given	 the	 explicitly	 different	 intentions	 between	 the	 youth	 and	 adult	 criminal	legislations,	both	in	the	stated	purpose	of	the	YCJA	and	the	bail	provisions	under	the	






successful,	like	rehabilitation.	The	earlier	we	start	these	initiatives,	the	better	for	all	involved.			So,	what	can	 the	YCJA	offer	us	 in	 terms	of	best	practices?	As	we	will	now	explore,	section	34	of	this	Act	is	informative.	
	
4.2	Assessment	Options	for	Mentally	Disordered	Young	Persons		Like	 their	 adult	 counter-parts,	 young	 accused	 persons	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 rely	 on	section	672.11	of	the	Criminal	Code	for	assessments	relating	to	fitness,	NCR	and	the	other	enumerated	grounds.	Like	adult	accused,	the	Crown	must	prove	the	requisite	





























































The	numbers	we	do	know	support	the	contention	that	the	less	interaction	one	has	with	our	police,	courts,	and	prison	systems	resulting	from	improved	mental	health,	the	better	off	our	community	is	–	in	terms	of	both	economic	and	social	costs.	While	more	empirical	research	is	needed	to	fully	understand	a	comparison	of	the	costs	of	arrest,	 prosecution	 and	 detention	 versus	 diagnosis	 and	 treatment	 of	 mentally	 ill	accused,	 there	 is	 both	 logic	 and	 an	 ethical	 argument	 to	 be	 made,	 even	 with	preliminary	 data.	 Since	we	 know	 our	 police	 are	 arresting	 people	who	 have	 fallen	through	 the	 cracks	 of	 the	 civil	 mental	 health	 legislation	 and	 services,	 we	 have	 a	responsibility	 to	not	only	 consider	our	other	options	 from	a	 fiscal	 standpoint,	 but	also	to	afford	human	dignity	to	our	mentally	 ill	accused	and	offer	real	opportunity	for	change.	As	Kent	Roach	has	taught	us:	“Parliament	deserves	much	of	the	credit	or	blame	for	the	state	of	our	justice	system.	Indeed,	even	in	those	areas	where	the	courts	have	been	most	active,	most	of	this	activism	can	be	explained	by	the	failure	of	Parliament	to	revise	and	 modernize	 the	 Criminal	 Code.	 Although	 the	 Court	 has	 emerged	 as	 a	stronger	 player,	 Parliament	 still	 plays	 the	 dominant	 role	 in	 our	 criminal	justice	system.”362	The	Courts	have	made	it	clear	that	their	powers	only	extend	so	far,	and	while	many	Judges	 would	 like	 to	 be	 able	 to	 order	 resources	 to	 become	 available,	 this	 is	 not	something	 they	 are	 able	 to	 do.	 In	 a	 different	 context,	 in	Newfoundland	(Treasury	





























	“Therapeutic	jurisprudence	explicitly	recognizes	that	an	accused	enters	and	leaves	the	criminal	justice	system	an	affected	person.	For	mentally	disordered	accused,	time	spent	entangled	in	the	criminal	justice	system	has	typically	produced	anti-therapeutic	results.	From	being	the	subject	of	abuse,	experiencing	a	lack	of	meaningful	treatment,	and	being	subject	to	higher	rates	of	incarceration,	mentally	disordered	accused	typically	do	not	fare	well.	It	is	now	a	generally	accepted	assertion	that	the	criminal	justice	system	has	failed	the	mentally	ill.”369		In	an	effort	to	repair	our	relationship	between	the	criminal	 justice	system	and	the	mentally	 ill,	 this	 discussion	 started	with	 a	 doctrinal	 review	 of	 the	 laws	 on	 bail.	 It	highlighted	some	areas	for	reform,	and	considered	bail	in	the	context	of	mentally	ill	accused	persons.	We	then	looked	at	the	current	intersection	of	our	criminal	justice	system	 and	mental	 health,	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 an	 adult	 accused	 person.	What	we	discovered	 is	 that	 the	 mentally	 ill	 are	 not	 being	 properly	 accounted	 for	 in	 our	attempts	 to	 reduce	 recidivism	by	addressing	 the	 larger	 societal	 issue	of	untreated	mental	 health	 disorders.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 promising	 provision	 afforded	 to	 youth,	found	 in	 section	 34	 of	 the	YCJA,	 gave	 us	 an	 example	 to	 look	 to	 for	 reform	 of	 our	
















































































































































































































(c) 	sentencing	 considerations	 where	 the	 Crown	 is	 requesting	 a	sentencing	option	that	would	result	in	a	conviction.		
Custody	for	assessment		









i)	 on	 the	 evidence	 custody	 is	 necessary	 to	 conduct	 an	assessment	of	the	accused	person,	or		
	
(ii)	 on	 the	 evidence	 of	 a	 qualified	 person	 detention	 of	 the	accused	 person	 in	 custody	 is	 desirable	 to	 conduct	 the	assessment	 of	 the	 accused	 person,	 and	 the	 accused	 person	consents	to	custody;	or			





(6)	A	judge	may,	at	any	time	while	an	order	made	under	subsection	(1)	is	in	force,	on	cause	being	shown,	vary	the	terms	and	conditions	specified	 in	the	order	 in	 any	 manner	 that	 the	 court	 considers	 appropriate	 in	 the	circumstances.		
	
Disclosure	of	report		
(7)	When	 a	 judge	 receives	 a	 report	made	 in	 respect	 of	 an	 accused	 person	under	subsection	(1),		
	













correctional	facility	for	adults	or	the	penitentiary	at	which	the	accused	person	 is	 serving	a	 sentence,	 if,	 in	 the	opinion	of	 the	court,	 withholding	 the	 report	 would	 jeopardize	 the	 safety	 of	any	person.			
Cross-examination		
(8)	When	a	report	is	made	in	respect	of	a	accused	person	under	subsection	(1),	the	accused	person,	his	or	her	counsel	and	the	prosecutor	shall,	subject	to	 subsection	 (9),	 on	 application	 to	 the	 judge,	 be	 given	 an	 opportunity	 to	cross-examine	the	person	who	made	the	report.		
	
Non-disclosure	in	certain	cases		







(14)	 In	 this	 section,	 qualified	 person	means	 a	 person	 duly	 qualified	 by	provincial	 law	 to	 practice	 medicine	 or	 psychiatry	 or	 to	 carry	 out	psychological	examinations	or	assessments,	as	the	circumstances	require,	or,	if	no	such	law	exists,	a	person	who	is,	in	the	opinion	of	the	judge,	so	qualified,	and	 includes	a	person	or	a	member	of	a	class	of	persons	designated	by	 the	lieu-tenant	governor	in	council	of	a	province	or	his	or	her	delegate.			
Statements	not	admissible	against	accused	









(b) determining	 whether	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 accused	person	 was	 disturbed	 at	 the	 time	 of	 commission	 of	 the	 alleged	offence,	if	the	accused	person	is	a	female	person	charged	with	an	offence	arising	out	of	the	death	of	her	newly-born	child;			
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